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By Franklin Obeng- OdOOm*
abstract. Nations and NGOs are promoting the idea of a transition 
from a petroleum- based civilization to one fueled by renewable energy. 
But there are many questions about how to proceed. The solution 
usually proposed is to develop “clean energy” as the underlying basis 
of a transition. Analysts tend to be concerned with climate change 
and land use change, with a focus on technical developments. Socio- 
ecological issues receive scant attention, especially if they relate to oil 
cities. This article starts from the perspective that progress in saving 
the planet from destruction can only be achieved by taking seriously 
past and present injustices and taking measures to rectify them. I use 
the situation in Port Harcourt, Nigeria to illustrate this proposition. I 
focus on three interrelated concepts: rent theft, social costs, and just 
transition. The central problem is rent theft because it is at the root of 
the “crime of poverty” and the social costs of plundering the land for 
energy sources. Until they address problems arising from historical 
injustice, campaigns for a just transition that promote clean energy 
in a bioeconomy will merely reproduce the central problem. Thus, 
reparations and land equity must be an integral part of any solution.
The Fossil Fuel Question
Oil cities and coal towns around the world have an ambiguous repu-
tation. As centers of production of the fuels that have been the engine 
of economic development, they are viewed as being necessary. But as 
focal points of the desire to create a “clean and green” world, they are 
considered an affront to ecological morality. Overcoming their history 
as sources of blight and transforming them into centers of healthy 
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production is now the objective. The need for ecological transfor-
mation of cities, towns, and regions seems to be intuitive (Watts and 
Kashi 2011; Economist 2020b). Some have formulated the task in 
terms of simply wishing away an enormous problem by “making oil 
cities history.” A deeper analysis is required. Systematic and detailed 
research shows that the nature of such cities, the form of transition, 
and the ramifications of the proposed transition need to be revisited 
because they do not reflect an understanding of the history of those 
cities (Pratt et al. 2014; Marais et al. 2021).
Three questions arise about the political economy of an equitable 
transition. First, how can urban economists theorize the relationship 
between fossil fuels and the economy by focusing on cities? Second, 
in what ways does the oil industry shape urban outcomes? Third, what 
other alternatives could be developed beyond the existing simplistic 
focus on making oil cities history?
The attempts to address such questions have been numerous. The 
resource curse literature in its various forms is voluminous, as many 
analysts have noted (Obi 2009; Obeng- Odoom 2014, 2018; Andrews 
and Siakwah 2021). Marxian alternatives have also been put forward 
(Nwoke 1984a, 1984b, 1986; Fine and Rustomjee 1996). However, 
these frameworks do not systematically consider urban land in time 
and space (Obeng- Odoom 2010a, 2014).
This neglect reflects Anne Haila’s (2016) wider critique that neither 
orthodox nor critical urban scholarship pays systematic attention to 
the land question. Georgist political economists make a similar ar-
gument about the literature on sustainability (Gaffney 2016; Obeng- 
Odoom 2021). In that vein, Haila created and taught a course at the 
University of Helsinki on “The Land Question and Sustainable Urban 
Development.”
Past efforts to develop a theoretical understanding of the role of 
land in achieving sustainable cities can be extended in three ways 
(Obeng- Odoom 2021). First, work has already begun on developing 
a holistic theory that makes land central to nature, not separate from 
it, such that ecologically detached “social relations” in space are re-
constructed as “socio- ecological relations and processes” (Haila 2011, 
2016: xxi). The second step involves moving beyond the tendency to 
view land and sustainability as multidimensional. We should consider 
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sustainability as intersectional at least and indivisible at best. Above 
all, we should ground the analysis of land and sustainability on the 
concept of rent theft. Third, researching oil cities in this way could 
help to understand the braided links between the body, motion, and 
value of oil energy (Mirowski 1989: 99– 138; Schobert 2014: 8– 9). That 
will help us understand not just space, but also time because fossil 
fuel is linked to urban transport. Studying location and time in relation 
to the way cities are shaped by fossil fuels is one way of reconstruct-
ing urban economics (Obeng- Odoom 2014, 2016).
This article draws on the interrelated concepts of rent theft, social 
costs, and the just distribution and use of land. It also uses data from 
oil cities in Africa, notably Port Harcourt in Nigeria. Those sources are 
the basis of my argument that rent theft is the central cause of urban 
inequalities, social stratification, and social costs from oil extraction. 
Without addressing the land question, just- transition campaigns that 
promote land use change in the form of bioeconomy, circular econ-
omy, renewables, and clean energy will merely reproduce the central 
problem.
The rest of this article is divided into five sections. The section on 
“rent theft” shows how the private appropriation of socially created 
rents generates concentrated growth, with persistent inequalities, so-
cial stratification, and socio- ecological crises. The section on “slaves, 
coal, and oil in the city” provides the historical context for rent theft 
in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. The section entitled “the crime of poverty” 
shows the paradoxical coexistence of prosperity and privation, driven 
by specific property relations. The treatment of “social costs” discusses 
the ecocide of rent theft. Finally, in a section on just transition and 
land equity, I look at the story of Port Harcourt as a way to understand 
concretely how the transition to a post- oil economy might occur and 
how it might affect an urban economy.
Rent Theft
As a concept in political economy, rent theft is distinct from the public 
choice concept of rent- seeking, which refers to the misuse of a politi-
cal system to gain advantage for a select number of people by chang-
ing relative prices, such as pre- and post- tariff prices (Krueger 1974; 
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Haila 2016: 121– 123). By contrast, rent theft is related to the private 
appropriation of socially created land rent (Obeng- Odoom 2021: 204– 
205). Rent always amounts to some form of unearned income, but the 
rent created by government regulations, as discussed in the public 
choice literature, is an order of magnitude smaller than the rent cre-
ated by nature and by social interaction in the form of land values and 
the value of oil in situ. Analyzing rent theft requires an exposition of 
the historical context of the oil industry. As suggested by Cyrus Bina 
(1992), such an analysis can neither be handled within the neoclassi-
cal nor the Ricardian traditions. The Marxian alternative has, to date, 
been the dominant approach to addressing the relationship of rent to 
the fossil fuel economy (Nwoke 1984a, 1984b, 1986; Bina 1992; Fine 
2019). Marxist analysis is also inadequate because it does not develop 
rent theft as a specific category.
Georgist land economics offers a more promising pathway, even if 
“rent theft” per se is not developed within George’s work. Theorizing 
rent theft must be based on an analysis of how urban landownership 
has been transformed in space and time, taking into account the wider 
context under which such relations have changed. The exposition of 
the ongoing effects of the transformation of property relations must 
be central to these analyses. In Nigeria, Akinlawon Mabogunje (2013: 
621– 652), the country’s most prominent urban scholar, has provided 
an overview of the landownership structure that can be used to ana-
lyze landed- property relations in Port Harcourt. Landownership in Port 
Harcourt is vested in the governor of Rivers State. Under this grand 
landlord are many “smaller” private landlords and customary users 
of land. As a grand landlord, the governor has historically granted 
transnational oil corporations the authority to lead the process of de-
velopment, often to the detriment of residents who claim a customary 
interest in land. A 1991 Supreme Court ruling affirmed the long- term 
right of people to the land in their village or region (Mabogunje 2013: 
637– 638). However, according to the Land Use Act of 1978, the gover-
nor, often a representative of the federal government, has to approve 
the use of land. The governor can also exercise the power of compul-
sory acquisition. Thus, while the rights of ordinary people to land are 
781Oil Cities in Africa
guaranteed in principle, in practice a powerful state, strongly aligned 
with oil interests, controls the use of land for oil- led development.
This land use ownership structure reflects a longstanding colonial 
logic. An all- knowing colonial state was responsible for development. 
Lower- level chiefs could participate in the system by concentrating 
on their local areas, but if there were conflicts, the final decision 
rested with the colonial state. Prior to British colonialism, the Nigerian 
land tenure system was customary. Living off the land, Nigerians did 
not seek to extract rent nor reinvest the surplus of their production. 
When there was sufficient production, those who worked the land 
relied on how much they had produced. When they had excess, they 
rested.
In the current system, however, federal leaders extract rents from 
subnational oil cities, only to return a modicum to where the resources 
were generated. Federal leaders can punish perceived insubordi-
nation by cities, towns, or regions with systematic underinvestment 
(Archibong 2018). State governments are both complicit and victims: 
complicit because they also are rent- extracting, but victims because 
they, too, are subject to federal power. The governor, the head of 
the state system, is complicit by being entrusted with landownership 
in the state. On a larger scale, the Nigerian federal state is a victim. 
Its power is curtailed by transnational corporations (TNCs) and by 
British, U.S., and other Western interests. So, rents that arise from na-
ture and society in Port Harcourt have typically accrued to landlords 
at one scale or another.
The longer this system persists the more entrenched it becomes. 
Processes of “circular and cumulative causation” help to explain this 
outcome (Myrdal 1944). So do the economic concepts of increasing 
returns to scale and economic stickiness (Archibong 2018). As rents 
have increased, TNCs have become more powerful, and they have 
extracted more rents. Similarly, the stronger federal powers become, 
the more rent they can extract. Even if they invest some capital back 
into oil cities, they still extract even more rents. There is progress, but 
it produces and persists alongside poverty.
Henry George (1885) described these contradictions some time ago 
as the “crime of poverty,” a process by which the private appropriation 
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of rent enslaves the poor to landlords. The wages of laborers are 
hostage to the wishes of landlords because the exaction of land rent 
takes away the surpluses that workers might otherwise accumulate 
and invest to gain economic independence. Incentives for hard work 
can be killed in this process, too. War, hunger, disease, and crime all 
stem from the control of land. The power of landlords to extract rent 
makes them masters, and the workers remain at the level of slaves.
Slaves, Coal, and Oil in the City
Arguably, Port Harcourt in Nigeria is the epicenter of the process that 
Henry George ([1879] 1935) observed, by which economic advance 
(“progress”) raises the potential for rent extraction that oppresses 
workers (“poverty”). The city stands out in both grandeur and glam-
our, but it was built on years of slavery that substantially helped British 
industrial development and commercial interests (Northrup 1978, 
2007; Afigbo 2006; Izeogu 2018). British actions and inactions enabled 
slavery to continue for at least 100 years after the “official” end of slav-
ery. After the slave trade drained the Niger Delta of its strong labor 
force (the people removed) and of the rich, uncompensated labor of 
the workers who remained, Britain led a new “legitimate trade” regime 
in which British interest was paramount.
Britain systematically undermined self- sustaining subsistence agri-
culture in favor of indigenous cultivation of cash crops such as palm, 
which helped Britain’s industrial development because palm oil was 
needed to produce the detergent that was needed for cleaning grease 
(Northrup 1978, 2007; Afigbo 2006; Izeogu 2018). Coal, discovered in 
the Niger Delta area in 1906, was also exported to Britain to satisfy 
British industrial needs, but Britain’s reliance on coal later declined.1 
From 1925 to 1944, port facilities and general commerce became the 
key economic function of Port Harcourt, although the port continued 
to support the coal industry. Like earlier trade regimes, the new trade 
system disproportionately benefited Britain:
Colonial administrations could finance themselves adequately, mainly by 
taxing international trade. Levies on imports and exports were the main 
single source of colonial government revenue. (Moore et al. 2018: 21)
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Of course, the transformation of the city also generated internal 
growth and change. Agglomeration economies played a critical role 
in this internal restructuring. For example, the Port Harcourt market, 
which was established in 1928, offered the advantages of information 
and trade (Izeogu and Salau 1985). Transportation economies also 
played a significant role in the economic development of the city. One 
example is the relationship between transportation and tin mining in 
the Jos Plateau:
Before the railway got to the Jos Plateau, the journey from the tin mines 
to the coast took 35 days and cost £29.10s a ton. With a connection to the 
coast at Port Harcourt in 1927, not only was the journey reduced to less 
than 35 hours, but the cost came down to £8 per ton, while exports rose 
from 10,926 tons in 1927 to 13,069 in 1928. (Mabogunje 1965: 420)
The volume of cargo in Port Harcourt more than doubled between 
1918 and 1923 (ignoring coal and railway materials). Imports rose 
117 percent, and exports increased 214 percent (Olokoju 1996: 123, 
Table 4).
Not only did this transport of cargo reduce transaction costs in 
Nigeria and other countries, the volume of trade via the port also sig-
nificantly supported the fossil fuel industry. The port carried 410,543 
tons of coal between 1917 and 1920 (Olokoju 1996: 109). That is an 
example of how coal substantially helped to increase the economic 
base of the city, including during the Second World War from 1939 to 
1945. During this time, many soldiers from Port Harcourt also fought 
in the war on the British side. Njoku (1981) shows that the Niger 
Delta, which accounted for some 75 percent of oil palm cultivation in 
Nigeria, provided a steady and substantial export of palm oil and palm 
kernel to Britain and other countries to make up for the shortfall of 
petroleum. By 1941, Nigerian “Win the War” funds had raised £12,000, 
and some 16,000 men had enlisted or been forced to enlist in the 
army to support the British war effort.
Neither the expected increases in farmer prices nor promises to 
ex- servicemen were systematically honored by Britain after the war. 
There was post- World War II urban and national rebuilding, and 
this was done through deliberate state intervention. For example, 
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infrastructure and various administrative facilities were concentrated 
in Port Harcourt ( Jaja 2009: 118). However, like the road and rail 
networks constructed by the colonial government of Nigeria, “state 
intervention” in Port Harcourt facilitated the extraction of resources 
from the hinterland to be transported to Britain.
Historically, rents socially produced but privately appropriated by 
the British colonial state and British landlords from so- called crown 
lands in Port Harcourt were early features of colonial domination 
(Wolpe 1974: 107– 108). In modern Port Harcourt, these issues have 
metastasized into a smorgasbord of concerns (Iwilade 2014).
All along, the British colonizers of Nigeria purported to be using a 
so- called indirect rule system. Theoretically, indirect rule consisted of 
allowing home rule under local customary authority, but in practice, 
the British administration used a tier of governance it had created it-
self and packed with its own officers to control the customary system 
for the purpose of colonial development. Thus, “indirect rule” was 
direct in terms of its palpable control through its supervisory power 
over the local system of self- governance. It was direct in three other 
respects. First, the British transformed the land tenure system. They 
did this by appointing chiefs where there had been none, by installing 
those who would support British interests, and by making custom-
ary land administration dependent on central government structures 
(Afigbo 1972; Berry 1992). Second, the British imposed a land tax with 
the aim of forcing Nigerians to work, even when they had produced 
enough to satisfy domestic needs. The land tax meant that people 
needed to work continuously to have extra money to pay the British 
land tax (Forstater 2005). Third, as argued by Rita Kiki Edozie (2017), 
indigenous capital was subordinated to foreign capital, as land, labor, 
capital, and the state in Nigeria were all restructured to support British 
interests.
Many African leaders consistently challenged this rule. The British 
colonists responded to this resistance by exiling such leaders, under-
investing in their regions, undermining their legitimate leadership, or 
simply assassinating these indigenous leaders (Afigbo 1972; Archibong 
2018: 330). Resistance continued, nevertheless, but at very serious 
cost to the leaders and their cities and regions. Eventually, however, 
Nigeria obtained its political independence from Britain in 1960.
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The post- independence era was expected to be radically different. 
Yet, in post- colonial “Nigeria, these federal regimes took on the iden-
tity of the British colonial autocrats from about 1885 to 1960 in the first 
period, and military postcolonial autocrats from 1966 to 1999 in the 
second period” (Archibong 2018: 331). In essence, the administrators 
were Nigerian, but the system was largely British. The Nigerian state 
tottered as it grappled with this legacy of colonialism. Coups broke 
out in which several military leaders sought to address inherited and 
imposed contradictions.
During the 1967– 1970 Nigerian Civil War, resistance to the violent 
neocolonialism of the Nigerian central government was framed as a 
“civil war” about secession related to the Biafra area. Many economic 
activities in Port Harcourt were moved away to other cities during this 
tumultuous period (Izeogu 2018: 116). The disproportionate control 
of oil resources by the Nigerian federal state and its imperial “part-
ners” was a key part of the concerns of the secessionists, who felt that 
the people of the Niger Delta area had been historically marginal-
ized in spite of the region’s substantial contribution to the rest of the 
Nigerian federation (Obi 2009: 115). One concrete concern was the 
loss of the distribution principle by which various regions in Nigeria 
received revenues proportionate to what they contributed. This was 
suddenly replaced by a new principle of sharing resources based on 
the size of population and need. For the secessionists, this sudden 
switch in principle instantly disadvantaged ethnic minorities in the 
Niger Delta area who also bore the greatest brunt of social costs from 
oil, commercial agriculture, and years of slavery.
The secessionists lost the war. Analysis of U.S. policy in Africa at 
the time of the war shows that, while claiming neutrality, the United 
States provided humanitarian relief to civilians who were suffering in 
Biafra but supported the Nigerian federal government’s position of 
centralizing authority (Cohen 2020: 81– 89). France, on the other hand, 
provided some support to the Biafrans, arguably because of its long- 
term interest to have a weaker federated Nigeria (Cohen 2020: 88). 
France also wanted to obtain a sizeable share of oil for itself through 
its national oil company, Elf- ERAP. As noted on the pages of Présence 
Africaine: “The prospect of monopolizing Biafra’s oil wealth made 
France … the secessionist State’s staunchest ally” (Feuser 1986: 120). In 
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this scramble for Nigeria, in which France dreamed of making the Gulf 
of Guinea a French oil lake, Britain took the side of a united Nigeria 
to continue as the overall beneficiary of the Nigerian oil industry, in 
which Shell BP played a controlling role, to avoid having to pay any 
taxes to a new Biafran government. In addition, Britain supported the 
Nigerian centralized system in order to prevent British companies from 
having to pay more royalties, which was a key demand of the Biafran 
leaders (Obi 2009: 115). The war, then, was not “civil.” Rather, it was a 
conflict not just about resources but also about the way land had been 
misused to entrench social stratification and persistent inequality.
By the end of the war in 1970, oil had become even more import-
ant. Much of this change in the power of oil could be linked to the 
rising price of oil and the growing dependence of the world on it 
(NNPC 2020). With popular and official discontent over the inability 
of the private sector to drive national economic change, and with 
growing satisfaction about the upswing of the oil market, the national 
managers of the Nigerian economy turned the oil industry into an 
instrument of state- led reconstruction, transformation, and indepen-
dent development, particularly between 1975 and 1980 (Adésínà 2012: 
293). The headquarters of Shell- BP, the largest oil producer in Nigeria, 
was located in Port Harcourt. The city and its environs became both 
the source and the base for Nigeria’s petrochemical industry (Izeogu 
and Salau 1985). With Port Harcourt becoming the key point of the 
import and export of oil and petroleum products (Izeogu and Salau 
1985), its port was also transformed into a specialized revolving door 
for oil and petroleum trade ( Jaja 2009). Systematic evidence com-
piled by Adésínà (2012: 294- 306) shows that, during this time, the Port 
Harcourt economy diversified: the share of agriculture in the GDP 
fell from 31.2 percent to 19.9 percent, while the manufacturing share 
increased from 3.3 percent to 8.1 percent. GNI per capita surged from 
around US$300 to US$600, too. Almost all industries in Port Harcourt 
were flourishing around this time, particularly textiles, cloth, and 
leather, fabricated metal products, repair services, and chemical prod-
ucts (including petroleum) (Izeogu and Salau 1985: Table 1).
Not only was there prosperity in Port Harcourt, the city became 
the center of the economic boom in Nigeria, reflecting a deliberate 
policy to use the city as a driver of growth and change. Consider 
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manufacturing. After independence, Nigeria implemented policies in 
support of import- substitution industrialization (ISI), leading to the 
development of a strong manufacturing base. At one point in the 
1980s, 8 out of 10 manufacturing industries in Rivers State could be 
found in Port Harcourt (Izeogu 1989: 61). Among these manufacturing 
industries were local oil refineries in Port Harcourt, the first of which 
was built in 1965 (Ogunsola 1990; Jesuleye et al. 2007; Ekpo 2014). 
Car assembly industries were built soon thereafter.
Volkswagen of Nigeria and Peugeot Automobile Nigeria were the 
two first assembly plants. By the end of 1975, the agreement to estab-
lish four other plants had been signed (Agbo 2011: 10). The industry 
was quite successful. Throughout the 1970s, “the Nigerian automobile 
industry had the capacity to assemble 108,000 cars, 56,000 commercial 
vehicles and 6,000 trucks per annum” (Ugwueze et al. 2020: 116). The 
symbiotic relationship between refineries producing fuel for cars and 
the increase in the number of cars in Port Harcourt is quite intuitive, 
possibly laying the groundwork for the linkages needed for further 
urban economic transformation. The share of manufacturing in real 
GDP increased from 4.73 in 1961 to 7.66 in 1970 (Chete et al. 2016: 
4). So, ISI and industrial policy generally seemed to be working as 
planned.
However, this policy orientation, while producing the needed 
change, was deemed still in need of improvement. Nigerian scholars 
point to how Britain kept its interests guaranteed by carefully sup-
porting Nigerian successors who were pro- British and, hence, pliable 
for imperial manipulation (Mabogunje 2013: 655– 656). British institu-
tions of land law remained. Indeed, they were strengthened further 
by designing new institutions in Britain to offer “technical assistance” 
and “training” to the new post- independence elites. The Department 
of Land Economy at Cambridge University was one such institution. 
Not only did it train a new cadre of land economists committed to 
maintaining the status quo, the department also created local educa-
tional institutions that trained estate managers to maintain the status 
quo and to guarantee British oil interests in Nigeria. D. R. Denman, 
the face of this land economy movement, was so influential in Nigeria 
that he was made a chief himself (Denman 1993: 237– 252). That 
 action symbolized the continuing influence of Britain in Nigeria, even 
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as Britain implemented so- called indigenization policies. So, import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) was significantly scaled up in 1971, 
when Nigeria’s indigenization policy was passed, followed by a much 
stronger 1977 decree on indigenization. Both policies on indigeni-
zation led to the “Nigerianization” of the key sectors in the Nigerian 
economy (Edozie 2017: 61– 62). So, Nigerians themselves increasingly 
began to occupy key leadership positions and participated in ongo-
ing developmentalism— active state involvement to ensure economic 
growth and social development (Mabogunje 1980: 5).
The Land Use Act of 1978 was passed during this time. By en-
trusting land to appointed governors, the aim was to ensure a single- 
minded drive toward developmentalism (Agbosu 1988; Mabogunje 
2013: 661). The Nigerian state used mineral rents to fund a strong 
social policy, as expected. Adésínà (2012: 294– 306) shows that pub-
lic education and healthcare flourished. Universal primary education 
was developed. Gross secondary school enrollment increased more 
than six times. The payment of university tuition fees was abolished. 
The quality of education also improved, as more teacher training col-
leges became a feature of professional teacher education. Healthcare 
provision expanded: not only did the per capita number of hospital 
beds increase, infant and under- five mortality rates declined. As the 
physical infrastructure greatly expanded, not only did the economy 
grow for a few, but also for the many. While there were policy mis-
takes, such as excessive control of public universities, overall both the 
economic and social well- being of Nigerians was greatly enhanced by 
oil- funded economic and social policy. This use of land and land rent 
by the federal state for social transformation, in essence, is what Anne 
Haila (2016), in another context, described as a “property state.”
Yet criticisms of this model were pervasive and persistent. When 
these criticisms were not about a lack of economic growth, they cen-
tered on cynicism about whether the state could continue to be a 
driver of development, or how oil was fueling conflicts (Obi 2009). 
In general, state- led developmentalism had other problems (Chinwe 
2014; Obeng- Odoom 2019, 2020b, 2021). They included an overcom-
mitment to growth, insensitivity to ecological questions, neglect of so-
cial problems caused by rising land values being captured by private 
landlords, and favoritism of certain groups by the federal state under 
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the guise of indigenization and local contents policies. For example, 
fuel import licensing programs and policies granting oil concessions 
benefited specific power groups, both local and expatriate. Either 
way, the historical stratification in Nigeria persisted, leaving many in 
the Niger Delta area in unequal property relations. Those problems 
inhibited deep social inclusion, impeded the development of local oil 
refineries, and consequently forced Nigeria to remain dependent on 
oil imports.
Perhaps the shrewdest criticism was to attach the label “rent- seeking” 
to the state. This act of creative mislabeling deemed the state inherently 
corrupt and conflated private rent- seeking behavior with the public 
use of land rent for social transformation. In Africa, this corruption 
of concepts and constructs, carried out by academics, the media, and 
Western political powers and classes, coupled with real internal prob-
lems in oil states, propelled the market- based paradigm to new levels of 
acceptability (Obeng- Odoom 2020a,2020b: 284– 287). There was both 
scholarly and political pushback, for example, by C. N. Nwoke (1984a, 
1984b, 1986) and the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (Obi 
1997). However, such careful analyses of the historical precursors to 
and legacy of Nigerian developmentalism were systematically over-
looked by market fundamentalists and Western interests. Joe Collins 
(2017: 150) has called this neglect of the evidence “scandalous.”
This scandalous evasion of the facts was not an isolated case. The 
market- led economy itself was ushered in through ideological and ac-
tual war and conflict. British influence, along with a wider Western in-
terest, sought to curb the advance of so- called socialism. As has been 
briefly mentioned, the Nigerian state slowly disintegrated, wracked 
by coups, a civil war (1967– 1970), and military rule (1966– 1979). 
Since the 1980s, Nigerian political economy has witnessed a surge 
in appeals to the market as the new governing principle (Obi 2009; 
Adésínà 2012). Amid coups, counter- coups, and military rule, up until 
May 1999, when the country returned to democratic rule, the period 
was characterized by ongoing appeals to market- based ideas of “good 
governance.” In essence, this meant a concrete shift from policies 
favoring import substitution industrialization (ISI) and indigenization 
to policies favoring industrialization by the promotion of exports and 
the institutionalization of foreign investment (Ekpo 2014). Yet, the 
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rise of the private oil industry in such a tumultuous period of quasi- 
democratic rule contradicts the idea that the market is the guarantor of 
freedom. The conditions for the turn to markets also cast doubt on the 
claim that transnational corporations (TNCs), the paragons of markets, 
are the best vehicles for social and democratic transformation, as new 
institutional economists tend to claim. (For a discussion, see Obeng- 
Odoom [2018].)
Obi (1997, 2009, 2019a, 2019b) has shown that Shell BP siphons oil 
rents out of Nigeria. The company receives significant backing from 
the Nigerian state, including military support, favorable tax laws, and 
other helpful institutions. Yet, relative to the rents it extracts, Shell BP 
offers very limited reinvestment in the Niger Delta area. Instead, other 
parts of Nigeria, the homes of powerful British- backed Nigerian elites, 
benefit disproportionately. Local revenues are also channeled back 
into the Nigerian central state, which must apparently share the rents 
from oil nationally. So, absentee landowners emerge both nationally 
and internationally, while the conditions of local producers deteriorate. 
Opposition arises, but is quickly suppressed. Supporters of this system 
of accumulation are exalted and rewarded. Meanwhile, the long- term 
withdrawal of the state from its classic 1975– 1980 developmentalism 
has meant that it cannot offer stable and decent employment.
Archibong (2018: 327) has documented how, politically, a three- 
tier governance structure has evolved from the long transformation in 
Nigeria. At the helm is the Federal Capital Territory, headquartered in 
Abuja. Next is the state government that exists in 36 states. Then there 
are some 774 local government areas at the base that are responsible 
for, among other things, governing cities and towns. Nigerian political 
economists typically argue that this system supports British and elite 
interests.
For Nigeria, the most distinguishing aspect of the historical development 
of this power- sharing arrangement is that the Nigerian national bourgeoisie 
had always operated as a junior partner in relation to the British colonial 
authorities and British finance capital before independence. This was also 
the relationship that the Nigerian bourgeoisie entered into in a postco-
lonial global system … [that] the Euro- American metropolitan centers of 
world imperialism and their transnational corporations have dominated 
since independence. (Edozie 2017: 66)
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A system of private involvement in governance percolates through this 
structure. For example, tax administration for the 36 states is some-
times outsourced to private companies (Moore et al. 2018: 117). Much 
has been written about “greed” in Nigerian politics (Collier 2009a, 
2009b; Watts and Kashi 2011). That has led to a range of programs 
to improve efficiency, transparency and so- called good governance, 
which is apparently undermined by a “new scramble for Africa,” in 
which Chinese and Indian transnational oil corporations have become 
the new conveyor belts for rent- seeking (Economist 2019: 9, 18– 20). 
Nigeria has swapped oil for infrastructure development with Chinese 
or Indian companies that do not require corresponding condition-
alities for “good governance.” The reforms that have enabled those 
swaps have been the focus of significant and sustained criticisms. 
African leaders are accused of romanticizing the power of South- 
South solidarity. Nevertheless, there have been attempts by the African 
Union, among others, to Africanize Chinese engagement (Chen 2020: 
52, 57). This has led many African scholars, such as Obi (2010) and 
Cline- Cole (2020), to strongly argue that the nuances of this Global 
South collaboration are misunderstood, even if this collaboration itself 
is nowhere near a panacea in its current forms.
Indeed, African unity is not systematically forged in a way to ad-
dress the historic problem of rent theft, as research on the African 
Continental Free Trade Area agreement also suggests (Obeng- Odoom 
2020c). But it is unwise to blame the most obvious sources of malfea-
sance until we have examined the forces that have generally escaped 
notice:
The inefficiency, extravagance and corruption which we commonly attri-
bute to governmental management are mostly in those departments which 
do not come under the public eye, and little concern, if they concern at 
all, public convenience. (George [1883b] 1966: 186; see also George 1883a: 
205)
If African nations have difficulty addressing the conditions that give 
rise to rent theft, we need to look for explanations. Instead of focus-
ing on individuals, I focus on patterns that give rise to inequality and 
social stratification.
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The Crime of Poverty
Poverty and long- term inequality in Port Harcourt have been per-
sistent. Over half a century ago, some 90 percent of Port Harcourt 
residents earned less than £200 per person per annum, while less 
than 1 percent of the residents earned £500 or more. But those figures 
applied only to the 11 percent of the population with formal employ-
ment (Wolpe 1974: 27). Most people in the city could be described as 
the “working poor.” Similar inequalities characterized wealth owner-
ship. As of 1964, 53 wealthy people owned 25 percent of the wealth. 
Of those 53, as many as 18 were expatriates (Wolpe 1974: 28).
Looking at conditions today, there is continuity between the pre- 
and post- colonial period, with serious implications for social cohesion. 
Socioeconomic disparities persist, whether compared to national av-
erages in wages, housing, or sanitation standards. In one large survey 
involving 833 residents of Port Harcourt, about 30 percent earned less 
than the minimum household wage of $120 per month (Nwokoro et 
al. 2015). Some 56 percent of the sampled households earned above 
the minimum wage but less than $401, while only 8 percent of the 
sample earned more than $400 per household per month. For house-
holds with an average size of six people, these wages are quite low, 
even if the profile of residents appears to be slightly better than in 
other cities such as Lagos, where some 67 percent of households earn 
less than the national minimum wage and only about 4 percent earn 
more than $400 (Lawanson and Oduwaye 2014). Indeed, slums, poor 
health profiles, and widespread challenging sanitation conditions pre-
vail in Port Harcourt.
The levels of poverty in Port Harcourt complicate the picture. As 
shown in Table 1, even though the number of people falling annu-
ally within the brackets of the poor has slowed down, the poverty 
gap— the additional income needed to lift the poor above the pov-
erty line— has surged. As absolute poverty declines, relative poverty 
increases.
“Nigeria accounts for nearly 20% of continental GDP and about 
75% of the West Africa economy” (African Development Bank 2019: 7, 
169). Indeed, these figures underestimate the real size of the Nigerian 
economy because they exclude a vibrant informal economy, which is 
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often estimated to be much bigger than the formal economy (Meagher 
2010; Lawanson and Oduwaye 2014; Nwokoro et al. 2015). Using 
the share of manufacturing in real GDP as a proxy for the size of 
the formal economy, it would appear that the formal economy has 
been shrinking. Between 1970 and 1981, the share of manufacturing 
dropped from 7.7 percent to 5.6 percent. By 2009, manufacturing had 
fallen to 3.7 percent (Chete et al. 2016: 4). As manufacturing work 
disappears, informal work becomes ubiquitous.
Meanwhile, the Nigerian oil- led economy continues to boom, a 
trend that will exacerbate the problem of inequality:
From 1980 to 2010, oil revenues contributed over three- quarters of the 
federal government’s revenues, nearly 97 percent of total exports, and 35 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP). (World Bank 2016: 1)
These national revenues arise from production of about 2.46 million 
barrels of oil per year, the sale of which yielded revenues around 
US$231 billion between 1970 and 1999 (Obeng- Odoom 2010b). The 
centrality of River States— especially the Niger Delta— to the oil indus-
try in Nigeria has been well- documented (Ukaga et al. 2012; Obi 2009, 
2019a, 2019b). Regarded as the sixth largest oil exporter in the world, 
Nigeria is widely acclaimed as a petroleum superstar ( Jesuleye et al. 
2007: 1339). But the wealth does not “trickle down.” The country is 
one of the poorest in the world. In terms of decent human conditions 
of life, out of 189 countries studied, Nigeria ranked 157 (Nwoke 2020: 
155). Thus, long- term inequality seems to have intensified with greater 
prosperity in Nigeria.
To this day, Port Harcourt is simultaneously one of the major cen-
ters of both industry and poverty in Nigeria. Bloch et al. (2015) put this 
claim in perspective. In terms of the number of firms, Port Harcourt 
is the home of 6 percent of all manufacturing industries in Nigeria, 
making it the fourth highest industrial concentration in the country 
after Lagos (47 percent), Abuja (7 percent), and Kano (7 percent). In 
terms of the concentration of technology firms, Port Harcourt ranks 
third, as it contains 8 percent of such industries. The point to note is 
that Port Harcourt may have a smaller share than Lagos, but it is the 
source of the high- value oil industry. Thus, the Onne Oil and Gas Free 
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Zone and Port Complex, located in Port Harcourt, makes it the only 
export zone with a total focus on oil and gas. Accordingly, more than 
30 oil and gas TNCs are registered in this area of Port Harcourt alone.
Herein lies a major contradiction. The Onne Oil and Gas Free Zone 
and Port Complex project was developed in 1982, as one of the key 
symbols of Nigeria’s structural adjustment programs (Okwuchukwu 
2018: 2– 5). Typically praised as one of Africa’s most efficient and 
most profitable ports, proponents claim that it is a testament to the 
“success” of the “landlord system.” Under that structure, the state gives 
land to private interests to develop industries and, in turn, to de-
velop communities through modernization of the Port Harcourt city 
economy (Pinwa 1999). Through agglomeration economies, the con-
centration of various complementary oil and gas industries in one 
location has driven up efficiencies and profitability. However, the cost 
of doing so has been extreme. Members of communities that were 
dispossessed of their land for the port facility remain unemployed, 
impoverished, and hopeless. The private beneficiaries do not appreci-
ate how entire communities— the Onne and Ogu communities— lost 
their livelihoods as a result of the Onne Oil and Gas Free Zone Port 
Complex (Okwuchukwu 2018: 2– 5). As a free zone, the private en-
tities operating the port facilities pay few, if any, taxes or duties, and 
they have virtually no obligations about how to use their capital or 
profit, even if they continue to experience remarkable growth (Pinwa 
1999). The landlord model, an apparent symbol of progress, is also 
the epitome of poverty.
The entire process of petroleum extraction, refinery, and consump-
tion has generated rents that have accrued to the propertied classes 
of Port Harcourt, while condemning many residents of the city to 
land insecurity, housing problems, and mass poverty. This “crime of 
poverty,” as Henry George called the division between the rent- paying 
many and the rent- collecting few, also creates serious social costs.
Social Costs
The interconnections between social deprivation, social stratification, 
and social costs have been modeled econometrically by Nigerian 
economists. The ultimate indicator of social cost is loss of life, mea-
sured by a low life expectancy. Akintunde et al. (2019) demonstrate 
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that, between 1980 and 2014, “carbon dioxide emissions, gross capital 
formation, health expenditure, and unemployment rate were signifi-
cant in explaining life expectancy in Nigeria [which is only 54 years].”
According to Kapp ([1950] 1971: vii), such social costs can be con-
sidered the damages caused by an enterprise that are borne largely 
by third parties and future generations that are not the primary bene-
ficiaries of the enterprise. Such social costs can have microeconomic 
foundations but, ultimately, they are not entirely driven by such causal 
processes. Thus, although an oil spill might arise from a leakage from 
the vessel of one oil company, the resulting social cost is the result of 
a wide range of events and processes.
This theory of causation is much broader than the narrow, techni-
cal approaches discussed under the rubric of the so- called resource 
curse, which focuses on individual events and ignores systemic fac-
tors. Conventional economic remedies emphasize end- of- pipe effects, 
and, hence, seek to redress social costs through the use of market 
instruments that presuppose causal factors that are separable. Kapp’s 
holistic approach to social costs, on the other hand, is more social 
and, hence, more environmental. Here, the environment is not just 
“out there,” it is part of the social. Causes are seen as both cumulative 
and self- reinforcing (Kapp [1950] 1971: xiv).
From this perspective, the social costs of disfiguring the land and 
poisoning the air in Port Harcourt are quite severe. Once celebrated 
as a “Garden City,” Port Harcourt is now a massively polluted city in 
a polluted region.
[As of] 2009, over 11 oil companies in the Niger Delta produced 2.7 mil-
lion barrels of crude oil each day, flaring about 17 billion cubic meters of 
associated gas and spewing 2,700 tons of particulates, 160 tons of sulphur 
oxides, 5,400 tons of carbon monoxide, and 12 and 3.5 million tons of 
methane and carbon dioxide, respectively. (Sanni et al. 2014: 254)
Indeed, studies comparing the amount of suspended particulate mat-
ter in the air for various Nigerian cities show that Port Harcourt is the 
most polluted, a city where pollution levels exceed WHO permitted 
thresholds (Yakubu 2018). See also Table 2.
So polluted is the city that black soot hangs over its residents, gen-
erating significant online media commentary (Salami 2018). That oil 
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extraction is the cause of this pervasive black soot in Port Harcourt is 
clear, but the precise explanation for this problem has been a source 
of contention. The activities of illegal oil refiners, the burning of oil 
by legal refiners, the police practice of setting fire to stolen items, and 
the activities of auto- part dealers have all been named as possible 
causes (Yakubu 2018). What tends to be overlooked, however, is also 
perhaps the most serious: TNCs export petroleum to Nigeria and other 
West African countries that is generally 100 times more sulphurous 
than what is permitted in Europe (Public Eye 2016: 5). The wide-
spread use of highly sulphuric gasoline from Europe, together with 
gas flaring, must be considered a major part of the explanation for the 
social costs of oil in Port Harcourt (Yakubu 2018).
TNCs support the “escape” of elites from gated estates in Port 
Harcourt to other cities when the former becomes too polluted. 
That is evidently one way in which gated communities have spread 
through Nigeria. Elites in Port Harcourt tend to move to Lagos where 
they develop even more gated estates (Uduku 2010). In turn, they 
force up rents in Lagos, a process that gives more power to landlords 
in that city. Tenants, on the other hand, are recurrently evicted in 
Lagos. Gentrification, then, is spread throughout Nigeria, leading to 
the reliance on cars for longer and wider commuting.
Port Harcourt is not only a site of oil production but also a major 
location for oil consumption. The city has a small rail track which is 22 
kilometers long (Ede et al. 2011). There is also a wide road network 
and an ever- growing program for road- building in the city. Examples of 
road construction include Ada George Phases I and II, Slaughter/Trans 
Amadi/Rumuobiakani, First Bank/Rumuomasi/Woji Old Aba, Rumuola/
Rumuokwuta Road, Trans Amadi, and the flyovers at Ada- George/
Airport Road and Agip/Rumueme/Abacha Road (UN- Habitat 2009: 20, 
fn. 36; Bloch et al. 2015). Urban transport is mainly provided by private 
cars, whether privately used or offered to the public on a commercial 
basis. In 1970, there were only 406 cars, but in 1973, the number had 
increased to 1,733. Around the same time when markets for oil and cars 
were booming, the number of private mini- buses increased from 631 to 
2,942, further augmenting markets on wheels (Izeagu and Salau, 1985; 
Agbo 2011). In addition, there were about 70,000 motorbike taxis in 
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Port Harcourt, another indication of the marketization of urban life 
and its resulting social costs (Ede et al. 2011; Obi 2019a).
The increase in traffic can be attributed to the deregulation of the 
automobile industry. The National Automotive Policy of 1993 started 
the process. The privatization of the six state- owned automotive as-
sembly plants marked a decisive shift to the market (Ugwueze et al. 
2020). Today, Nigeria produces— or at least assembles— many of its 
own cars. However, many more of the cars on Nigerian roads are 
imported. Of the 60,000 cars imported each year, largely from the 
Global North, only 15 percent are new. So the Global North discards 
its most environmentally polluting cars to Nigeria (Agbo 2011). In this 
way, the Global North has become the biggest beneficiary of Nigerian 
deregulation, not only because it has obtained a free dumping ground 
but also because it is paid for dumping its waste.
Port Harcourt has become addicted to cars. The city craves more 
petroleum and petroleum products. It is in this area that the refiner-
ies have made their biggest impact on consumption. Although most 
of Nigeria’s oil is exported, in Port Harcourt, a great deal of refining 
activity is going on. Port Harcourt has two of Nigeria’s four refiner-
ies. Of the 450,000 barrels- per- stream- day (bpsd) refining capacity in 
Nigeria, Port Harcourt alone has about half (210,000 bpsd) (Jesuleye et 
al. 2007: 1339). In 2017, the estimated average aggregate demand for 
petroleum products in Nigeria was 750,000 bpsd (Ogbuigwe 2018). Of 
that amount, demand in Port Harcourt alone is about 28 percent. These 
refineries, collectively called the Port Harcourt Refining Company Ltd., 
produce petroleum, kerosene, automotive gas oil, and low pour fuel oil.
These petroleum products are used by households not only for 
cooking but also for powering homes. Nigeria is largely dependent on 
hydro- electricity; however, power generation is mostly via oil in three re-
spects. First, the hydro plant itself is dependent on oil. Second, the hydro 
power is unreliable. Ayodeji Olukoju (2004) famously pointed out that 
the Nigerian National Electric Power Authority, NEPA, is better known in 
Nigeria by its nickname: “Never Expect Power Always” (NEPA).
The country enjoys a coverage rate of almost 100 percent, which would 
deceptively imply that it has achieved the goal of universal electrification, 
at least in the urban areas. However, fewer than 20 percent of households 
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report having electricity at least most of the time. About 51 percent of 
households report having electricity occasionally in their dwelling. … 
Often, although the electricity supplied to households might be sufficient 
to power a light bulb, the capacity is not enough to power a fan or refrig-
erator. (Blimpo and Cosgrove- Davies 2019: 21)
Consequently, petrol- powered generators have become the norm for 
the wealthy, the most influential Nigerians as well as the political 
classes. Third, others who are not able to afford petrol, use candles 
and lanterns, which are also dependent on kerosene, another petrol 
product. Similar comments apply to industrial purposes for which 
machines are powered by petrol- supported generators (Olukoju 2004).
Several interests have sustained this consumerism. Transnational 
oil companies have contributed to it. British Petroleum built the first 
refinery in Port Harcourt to increase demand for gasoline. As demand 
typically exceeds what can be supplied locally, a new market for im-
ported petroleum products is created where, again, TNCs dominate in 
the supply of imported petroleum products. Off the road, they deal 
in generators, and on the roads, in cars. Currently, the city has some 
53 fuel stations (Orupabo and York 2018). With growing influence in 
the planning of the city, TNCs shape the institutions of urban planning 
and, hence, the planning of the city in such a way that it is regularly 
in need of gasoline.
State complicity is often understood as “corruption,” but it often 
takes the form of subsidizing fuel, underinvesting in public transport, 
and neglecting the planning of public space and housing. The roll out 
of formal land title registration is ostensibly to give security of tenure, 
but in fact it has developed the foundations of a capitalist urban econ-
omy, decollectivized land, and, hence, reduced the possibility of col-
lective mobilization against capitalism as a system. “The cost of merely 
titling land in … Port Harcourt is about 30 percent of the construction 
cost” (World Bank 2016: 16). Hence, valuers or assessors have to make 
similar adjustments for rental values. In turn, private landlords have 
been major beneficiaries of increasing rents to which they contribute 
by speculating on land (Izeogu 2018).
The levels of particulate matter in Port Harcourt illustrate how pol-
lution results from increased demand for imports of the dirtiest fuels 
on the planet. Current estimates show that Port Harcourt is one of the 
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most polluted cities in the world. Some 50 percent of particulate mat-
ter in the city relates to petroleum consumption alone. Hence, the ma-
jority of cars in Port Harcourt are seen as transmitters of atmospheric 
pollution, but they have been fueled in filling stations that sell highly 
contaminated petrol and diesel (SDN 2020: 16). (See also Table 2.)
This volume of pollution leads to additional consequences. The 
high sulphur content of fuel in Port Harcourt shapes the quantity 
of particulate matter in the air. The relationship between these two 
variables is complex. A counterintuitive mechanism is built into state 
enforcement actions. State agencies target artisanal fuel production in 
order to reduce the production of high- sulphur fuel. To achieve that 
goal, they end up burning confiscated fuel in an open space. The 
targeting of informal operators seems unfounded as excessive sulphur 
content has been found in both official and informally produced fuel. 
The Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN 2020: 28) explains that 
the results favor the informal sector:
[O]ur analysis identified higher levels of sulphur in official supplies. … 
[U]sing official diesel increases particulate emissions by an estimated 13% 
compared to using unofficial products.
The spread of formally registered filling stations in Port Harcourt com-
plicates this picture, as the wider the net of filling stations is cast, the 
more widespread the problem becomes (SDN 2020: 29). Not all of 
the problem is internal. There is global complicity, as TNCs supply 
fuel with excessive sulphur content. But whether globally or nation-
ally, formally or informally produced, the resulting soot in the air is 
often washed into water bodies to create secondary pollution. The 
soil becomes another casualty, as other pollutants, including sulphur 
dioxide and particulate matter seep into it, affecting the quality of 
food (Abali et al. 2018; SDN 2020).
Usually, planners of the state are blamed for being corrupted, but 
this diagnosis misses what planners say about the conditions under 
which they work. More fundamentally, the critique locates the prob-
lem only at the local or national level. Both problems are serious 
enough to alter our analysis. Consider interviews with the planners of 
Port Harcourt, who show a strong commitment to the sustainability of 
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the city (Echendu 2020). What planners mean by sustainability varies, 
but the idea of self- sufficiency, independent growth and change, and 
the use of land for public purposes are recurrent themes in planners’ 
ideas about sustainability.
Nwozor et al. (2020) show that the state and its agents are not 
always to be taken at their word, as their deeds may contradict their 
rhetoric. For instance, after unsuccessfully trying to eliminate the in-
formal economy of oil refineries through force with the support of the 
Nigerian military, the state and its planners contend that they are now 
keen to support artisanal oil workers who operate informal refineries. 
In this alternative approach, they seek to license rather than to destroy 
informal refineries. However, the process and the cost of licensing 
are skewed towards powerful mid- range refineries, not the majority 
of local groups. These mid- range refineries have strong ties to the oil 
TNCs in Nigeria, too. So, the “alternative” is really a continuation of 
the status quo.
Similar processes have taken place in other oil cities in Africa. In 
Nigeria, oil cities include Warri in the Niger Delta area, Eket in Akwa 
Ibom state, and Kaduna in North Central Nigeria. In Ghana, Sekondi- 
Takoradi is an example, as is Abidjan in Cote d’Ivoire. In every case, 
urban economic growth has been contradictory. The concept of a 
“resource curse” has been used to explain the economic problems 
and political corruption that accompany oil deposits. However, in the 
Global South, as systematic research on some of these cities shows, 
their experiences are not the result of a national resource curse 
(Obeng- Odoom 2014, 2020a, 2021).
Rather, they reflect the contradictions of a global system in which 
urban land rent is privately appropriated. In the case of cities in 
mineral- rich regions, the value of those deposits permeates the pro-
cess of urban economic development. Unless the value of mineral 
wealth is shared widely, as was attempted in Nigeria in the 1960s, an 
oil city just becomes a magnet for those who engage in rent theft. A 
global land market underpinned by uneven property relations insti-
tutionalizes this rent theft. In this system, African oil does not simply 
fuel industrial processes nationally or, even, regionally. Instead, oil 
cities in Africa are central to the industrial and commercial interests 
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of the global order both in historical and contemporary times. The 
resulting “crime of poverty” and worsening “social costs” require an 
immediate discussion of land equity.
Just Transition and Land Equity
There is now a consensus that the world must replace fossil fuels. 
Scholars around the world posit a “just transition” to renewable energy 
as a panacea. The emphasis is on how “dirty” current production sys-
tems are, and how the falling price, rising cost, and growing scarcity 
make it unprofitable to continue to invest in fossil fuels (Economist 
2020b). “Today fossil fuels are the ultimate source of 85% of energy. 
But this system is dirty” (Economist 2020a).
This way of thinking about the problem shapes the dominant re-
sponse: the need to support clean energy and cheap, abundant renew-
able energy. Coupled with the development of new technologies and 
advanced drilling techniques, the best oil cities can diversify both within 
and outside the framework of petroleum production (Obeng- Odoom 
2019, 2020b, 2021). In the former case, natural gas producers could 
switch to oil production and refining, or they could explore new forms 
of unconventional sources of gas, such as shale. In the latter case, they 
can also invest in other sources of energy as a hedging strategy (Melosi 
and Pratt 2014). Much dirtier fossil fuels— notably coal— could also 
be abandoned, while oil will be more slowly phased out (Economist 
2020b). “Unlike natural gas and oil, [coal] is concentrated carbon, and 
thus it accounts for a staggering 39% of annual emissions of CO2 from 
fossil fuels” (Economist 2020b). In all cases, market instruments can 
play the added role of facilitating uptake of the new energy sources.
Changing coal habits requires not only ending market disincentives, 
such as removing subsidies from coal pricing formulae, but also using 
market incentives, such as competitive pricing of renewable energy 
devices, to further enhance their global uptake (Economist 2020b: 13). 
Mainstream environmental economics sustains the idea that growth- 
centrism can be delinked from a “carbon upsurge” (Rosewarne et al. 
2014). There is a role for the state in all this: to compensate the banks, 
companies, local governments, and workers, for whom compensa-
tion comes in the form of retraining (Economist 2020b: 13). However, 
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Kapp ([1950] 1971: xix) argues that microeconomic incentives are 
ineffective:
This principle of internalization of social costs guides some proposals 
designed to prevent these costs by such indirect methods of control as 
the levying of fines on producers who pollute, of penalties according to 
the volume of effluence, or of offering incentives (e.g., tax reductions or 
subsidies) to producers in order to induce them not to pollute. … Such 
methods may be helpful in specific cases, but as a general rule they are 
of doubtful value and effectiveness. They seem to be unreliable both as to 
their efficacy and efficiency; they leave the decision of control to individual 
units, they are slow to take effect and difficult to administer, and hence 
their results are uncertain.
The demand for investing in renewable energy sources is growing 
under the rubric of a “just transition.” U.N. agencies, activists, critical 
social scientists, liberals, and libertarians are united in their support 
for the shift from fossil fuels to renewables. They insist on more than 
prevention of more pollution using emissions technologies. They also 
expect negative emissions technologies (NETS) to cure or sequester 
existing emissions. Emissions technologies and negative emissions 
technologies are supposed to be complementary (Krupp et al. 2019). 
However, most of these claims overlook the interconnections between 
renewables and fossil fuels (Obeng- Odoom 2021). Numerous strat-
egies have been proposed regarding a just transition, but they are 
centered largely on plans to create “green jobs.” (For a detailed over-
view and critique of these plans, see Marais et al. [2021].) To date, 
campaigns to promote a “just transition” are often linked to the circu-
lar economy or the bioeconomy. The proponents say little or nothing 
about a change in land tenure and property relations, focusing instead 
on land use and behavioral changes. They may also express a desire 
to make capital more environmentally conscious and to limit or cur-
tail growth, but they fail to analyze the intersections between global 
stratification, land, and the sustainability crisis.
Those who have raised the land question in Nigeria have strongly 
advocated individual private landownership. Three arguments have 
typically been made for this advocacy (Binuomoyo et al. 2012). First, 
assertions are made that the governors do not effectively utilize the 
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land. Second, governors have been accused of abusing their power, 
which is arbitrary in terms of compensation, processes, procedures, 
and overwhelming support for oil TNCs. A third proposition is that 
individuals would be better managers of their own land. This logic of 
privatization informs Nigeria’s land registration system. (Mabogunje 
[2013: 621– 652] provides a detailed account in his autobiography.) In 
the view of those who contend that private landownership is the best 
answer to the land question, Nigeria is a developing country with a 
vision of becoming developed, and thus its land tenure system must 
become like that of the developed countries.
This proposed land privatization solution, however, misses the 
point. The resistance in Port Harcourt seeks concrete alternatives that 
would transform existing rent theft. With a history as long as rent theft 
itself, this resistance has become synonymous with urban politics in 
Port Harcourt.
Two features of this radical resistance demand emphasis, however, 
because they are relatively new. First, the youth of Port Harcourt are 
becoming increasingly involved; second, many of the groups are much 
better organized and much stronger than they used to be (Iwilade 
2015). Specialists in the political economy of oil in Nigeria (Obi 2009, 
2019a, 2019b; Ogbuigwe 2018) also attribute this growing complexity 
of radicalism to the braided links between unequal resource control 
and the need for redistribution.
The experience of Port Harcourt points to a simple conclusion: A 
just transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy needs to focus 
more on justice and less on technology. A variety of policies may 
succeed in reducing dependence on oil and fostering decentralized 
production. But the underlying problems of historical and continu-
ing inequality, social stratification, and neocolonialism will not be 
abated. Above all, as the world transitions to economies beyond oil, 
the importance of land as the site of all production will become more 
obvious. Cheap fossil fuels made constant mobility possible, which al-
lowed us to ignore the economy of “place” for generations. However, 
humanity now enters a period that requires us to face the need to 
treat socio- spatial relations in an ecologically sensitive and equitable 
fashion by reducing or eliminating rent theft.
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Commoning land, including urban space and oil, is one concrete 
way to address ongoing concerns about rent theft. Doing so could entail 
the use of a tax on land values to solve the paradox of “progress and 
poverty" (George [1879] 1935). In practical terms, that economic para-
digm entails the socialization of privately appropriated rents from land 
currently in the possession of the TNCs. Land that is not yet privatized 
can be collectivized, not in the Marxist sense, but in the Georgist sense 
of commoning land rents. In this economic model, oil commons could 
still be drilled but mainly for need and self- sufficiency. Labor need not 
be saddled with the payment of income taxes for actual clean work 
done. Instead, by taxing land values, those who currently hold land out 
of use will be motivated to make it available for economic activity. That 
will expand the commons and give people much greater access to and 
control over previously privatized spaces for work, rest, and family time.
In this new society, the scale of drilling oil can be significantly re-
duced. Here is one strong basis for a “transition to a low- energy future” 
(Kreps and Cobb 2020: 617). Similarly, commoning urban land would 
enable the development of greater public and social housing and 
transport, curb sprawl, gentrification, and put an end to the excessive 
reliance on private automobiles, motorcycle taxis called okada, and 
the chain of private fuel stations that keeps the wheels of accumula-
tion turning (Obeng- Odoom 2021). Over time, the local industries that 
assemble vehicles could downscale, as could the large- scale importa-
tion of oil. A tax on land values promotes a more compact city, one 
that makes possible more public transport, pedestrian- friendly streets, 
and cycling. This vibrant urban economy is one in which the energy 
mix is diverse and local resources are not simply exported but are 
mainly used to generate local energy and address local needs.
Such processes of self- sufficiency and low- oil transformation could 
channel significant oil revenues into state and urban government cof-
fers to build social states with improved state capacity. Those pro-
cesses could also diversify the economy away from fossil fuels and 
restructure urban and regional development to prioritize public and 
social housing. Singapore provides one example of how a modern city 
can provide both housing and public services from land rents rather 
than allow that social surplus to be squandered on private luxuries 
(Haila 2016). Alternatives for greater inclusivity can be considered.
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For example, many of the jobs created in the oil cities of the fu-
ture will also be different. Some have called such employment “green 
jobs” (Pearce and Stilwell 2008; Stilwell and Primrose 2010; Acey and 
Culhane 2013; ILO 2014). That sort of employment can be character-
ized as small scale and often not for profit. It does not threaten the 
environment but rather enhances it and improves social conditions 
for labor. These micro industries can flourish because, as Pyke (1992) 
shows, it is not the size of local industries, but rather their relation-
ships to one another and to society that drive forward and backward 
linkages and reinforce economy- society- environment relations.
As part of a just transition, existing TNCs will need to follow new 
standards for production quotas, socially sensitive technologies, and 
a declining model of oil exports (Adu 2009). Progressively reducing 
reliance on oil, then, is a key goal for oil cities in Africa. Restructuring 
cities and regions to be less dependent on oil is a complementary 
goal. That such demands are made by the majority of Africans who are 
protesting makes these options politically defensible. Analytically, too, 
these options are defensible. In the absence of policies that foster the 
commoning of land, speculation heats up the price of land, expelling 
the poor and the marginalized to the edges of the city, which are usu-
ally served by commercialized transport. By reining in that speculation, 
communal living becomes not only possible but also encouraged, and 
cities can be built as commons, not only within but also across African 
nations in spaces already governed by pan- African legislation.
In this scenario, oil cities will not merely be doing damage control. 
They will also be contributing to greening the world. Janis Birkeland 
(2020) argues for a “net- positive design,” in which cities not only re-
duce their ecological footprint but also contribute to cleaning the 
world. This idea can more compellingly be made when urban land is 
treated as a commons. Not only biodiversity, but also soil health can 
be restored. Habitat creation can also flourish and be institutionalized, 
along with nurturing healthy urban, regional, and global relationships.
None of these resulting consequences could address past wrongs 
of rent theft. Slavery, for example, has left lasting and ongoing prob-
lems of social stratification in Port Harcourt. No amount of common-
ing can address those problems adequately. Similar comments apply 
to the loss of fertile lands and biodiversity in general. Past practices 
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that once made agriculture sustainable are not going to be recovered 
easily.
Existing mechanisms to address past wrongs are centrally based 
on “helping” Africa to “adapt” to “climate change.” Negotiated within 
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), they 
take the form of green aid, which recognizes that the richer countries 
are more responsible for emissions but that the poorer nations of the 
Global South, particularly those in Africa, are forced to adapt to the 
disproportionate effects of climate change. Currently, this compen-
sation is an annual payment of $100 billion (Adow 2020). Both the 
rationale and the estimates of such reparations are problematic. They 
exclude the social costs of slavery. The movements for reparations 
against slavery, including those championed by the Group of Eminent 
Persons (GEP) established by the African Union in the 1990s, continue 
to keep the demand for slavery- related reparations alive (Howard- 
Hassmann 2004). It is significant that the group included J. F. Ade 
Ajayi and M. K. O. Abiola, both prominent Nigerians, who also put 
the case for reparations in Nigeria and Africa more widely. Although it 
has been argued that the committee experienced challenges of strat-
egy, including whether to combine slavery and colonialism as a basis 
for reparations and whether to work as individuals or as a group, 
GEP and the wider case for reparations enjoy, to this day, the over-
whelming support of Africans in Africa and others elsewhere in the 
diaspora (Howard- Hassmann 2004). So, the remedy must be carefully 
and clearly defined.
What must be compensated is rent theft. Historically, the most for-
midable strategy for addressing the wrongs of slavery has been the 
triple strategy of apology, reparations, and prevention. For Blacks up-
rooted and sent to the Americas, that strategy would entail:
1. a formal apology to signify acknowledgment,
2.  restitution or compensation in the form of the present value of the 
promised “40 acres and a mule” (subject to various adjustments), 
which were never delivered to freed slaves, and
3. steps to prevent further stratification (Darity and Mullen 2020: 2, 
261– 270).
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In Africa, apart from these three elements, socio- ecological debt 
would also need to be compensated. Any such estimates must take 
into account context. So, for the entire city of Port Harcourt and the 
Niger Delta area in Nigeria, the assessment would need to be differ-
ent. One approach is what I call social opportunity cost. An analyst 
using this approach would need to envision how the region might 
have developed if oil rents had been reinvested in Africa instead of 
being transferred to Europe and elsewhere in the Global North. From 
that analysis, one might estimate how much money the British gov-
ernment and its transnational corporations, along with other Western 
powers that benefited from this trade, should pay in reparations.
Three scenarios are possible for Port Harcourt. The first involves 
a rediscovery of what worked in the past. Izeogu (2018) offers the 
most optimistic scenario, one in which the state is willing to both 
entertain and encourage alternative programs. This optimism would 
mean a reinvention of Nigeria in a process that would see Africa’s 
giant oil producer renewing its original commitment to a developmen-
talist agenda. After all, what the state did in the past it can do again. 
Although developmentalism did not have any carefully developed 
green commitment, that could presumably be remedied, along with a 
strong commitment to social inclusion.
A second scenario, which involves fulfilling U.N. goals, is bleak be-
cause it does nothing to increase the sharing of wealth. Rent theft has 
both local and global champions who are likely to push back. Western 
nations and the TNCs headquartered in them typically close ranks and 
look out for one another. Britain continues to commit itself to cutting 
emissions at home, but it enters into new arrangements of rent theft to 
benefit the British fossil fuel TNCs. Similarly, Norway is committed to a 
greener world, although it is still involved in global petroleum devel-
opment within the rent theft model. China, India, Japan, and Australia 
in Australasia are similarly oriented.
As chronicled by Mohamed Adow (2020: 64– 66), promises of 
green reparations have been systematically broken. The 1992 U.N. 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro 
(the “Earth Summit”) concluded with the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” to recognize that the world’s wealth-
ier nations owe an ecological debt to the poorer nations. The Kyoto 
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Protocol in 1997 appears to have placed some enforceable claims 
against the world’s elite countries, but at the 2009 U.N. Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen, the wealthy nations prevaricated by fail-
ing to commit themselves to actions that they had agreed to take 
under legally binding treaties in 1992 and 1997. Finally, at the climate 
meeting in Durban, South Africa in 2011, the wealthier nations closed 
ranks to push an agenda that would require all nations to be equally 
responsible for addressing climate change. This amounted to a com-
plete reversal from 1992. This long string of betrayals may have ended 
in 2015 with the Paris Agreement, which seems to have returned to the 
intentions of the Earth Summit in 1992. It concluded with a stronger 
commitment to prevent the rise of temperatures beyond the threshold 
of 1.5– 2.0 °C. In addition, the wealthier nations committed $100 bil-
lion a year to support the poorer nations’ fight against climate change 
by replacing fossil fuels. But it remains hard to judge this commitment, 
since much of the assistance consists of loans that must be repaid or 
direct foreign investment under outside control (Adams 2020). Indeed, 
there is also a significant gap between the $100- billion- a- year policy 
to support existing estimates of fair reparations to Africa and the $100 
trillion academic estimate made by D. T. Osabu- Kle (2000: 344– 345). 
Scholars are skeptical about whether such estimates can be honored 
under the banner of the United Nations, and, even if paid, they ques-
tion how such a sudden injection of resources would be managed and 
distributed (Howard- Hassmann 2004; Zouache 2020).
Even under the best of circumstances, which D. T. Osabu- Kle (2000: 
346– 348) implies would be for Africa to be paid only the annual inter-
est on the $100 trillion due to it, the U.N. methods of rectifying past 
wrongs are exceedingly limited. Such approaches restrict the agreed 
amount of compensation to a level far below the damage previously 
caused by slavery, colonialism, and neocolonialism. U.N. paradigms 
exclude the idea of rent theft. Like other humanist paradigms, they 
continue to rely on markets and business as usual to aid the transition. 
Clearly, both the mainstream and its alternatives appeal to a bioeco-
nomy, renewables, and the circular economy. But one may question 
how effective these strategies would be, even if they were realized. 
Even in a “best- case” scenario in terms of technology transfers, or so- 
called nature- based solutions, rent theft would remain, indeed worsen. 
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Regardless of the transition to a cleaner world, both the “crime of pov-
erty” and mass “social costs” would become aggravated.
A third scenario is more uncertain, developing features of both the 
first and the second scenarios. Whichever scenario prevails, however, 
the status quo is problematic. The existing drive for a cleaner world is in-
adequate. An alternative, based on the equitable distribution of land and 
its benefits, offers the most holistic response to the fossil- fuel question.
Conclusion
Addressing urban issues must entail an analysis of urban land rent, as 
Anne Haila’s life’s work has systematically demonstrated. In extending 
this lesson and methodology, it is crucial to investigate the question 
of urban sustainability. Haila recognized this need and, hence, created 
a course at the University of Helsinki on “The Land Question and 
Sustainable Urban Development,” currently taught by members of the 
Helsinki School of Critical Urban Studies.
One way to deepen this legacy, as I have shown here, is to study 
the energy of cities because it expands the repertoire of sustainability 
from a dyadic emphasis on socio- spatial relations to a non- divisible 
triadic study of socio- spatial relations within a wider ecological frame-
work. Transitioning from oil to renewable energy is, therefore, a use-
ful starting point, but it is not simply about producing clean energy. 
Ending the use of “dirty fossil fuels” will improve life in Port Harcourt, 
but a cleaner city will allow landlords to charge more rent for hous-
ing and commerce. Unless the ongoing problem of rent theft is ad-
dressed, the situation will actually worsen for the working class, for 
others who work in the informal economies, and for those, such as 
the  descendants of slaves, who have had to scavenge rather than 
work, who work precariously, or who are condemned to degrading 
and invisible lives elsewhere in society. If cities like Port Harcourt 
focus on simple symptoms and solutions, they are likely to reproduce 
extremes of long- term inequality, social stratification, and social costs, 
even in the context of renewables.
By contrast, reconstructing the problem of how to achieve a just 
transition by ending land rent theft refocuses the problematic on 
its deeper causal forces, the “crime of poverty” and “social costs.” 
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The theft is historical, substantial, and continuously destructive. The 
Western- dominated slave trade provided a pattern that the oil trade 
later followed. Both were centered on the social reproduction and pri-
vate appropriation of rent within a dependent and oppressive system. 
Because the inherited system is structurally colonial and colonizing, 
top- down approaches miss the point when they focus on reducing 
carbon emissions while ignoring the suppressed hopes of those bur-
dened by rent, including workers.
I propose a number of specific remedies that could make possible 
a just transition to a post- carbon city without preserving the legacy 
of land rent theft. I emphasize three of them here because they are 
central to my arguments.
First, cities have the capacity to make land common property, not by divid-
ing it up into equal shares but simply by sharing the land rents in equal 
measure. This can be done by taxing land values and either distributing 
the proceeds equally among residents or using the revenue to carry out 
projects of public benefit.
Second, justice in the transition to a new economy cannot be achieved 
without rectifying past wrongs by whites that continue to affect Black peo-
ple in the present. To that end, governments in the Global North will need 
to apologize, institutionalize reparations, and prevent further injustices.
Third, oil cities need to restructure urban and regional development by 
socializing oil rents and by using them for socio- ecological purposes.
Those three actions need to be taken in conjunction with the policies 
proposed by the United Nations to substitute renewable energy for 
fossil fuels. Together, they can significantly advance efforts to make 
socio- ecological justice meaningful in oil cities in Africa, beyond just 
transition.
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Note
1. Between 2013 and the first half of 2020, the share of electricity gen-
erated by coal in Britain declined from 40 percent to 2 percent (Economist 
2020b: 21). This dramatic decline is attributed to initial overuse, the introduc-
tion of new technology, the development of new energy sources that were 
cheaper, and sustained pressure to mitigate the socio- ecological costs of coal 
( Jevons [1906] 2012; Economist 2020b: 13, 20- 22; Obeng- Odoom 2021)
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